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Abstract. Some manufacturers are reluctant to rationally share their Information Systems 
(ISs) with their dealers. Through a detailed case study analysis, we explore what could impel 
a manufacturer to overcome its reluctance by analysing its control problems (lack of direction; 
motivational; and personal limitations). We show that sharing ISs provides benefits derived 
from the collection of information in both quantity and quality that is in turn utilized by the 
manufacturer. It ensures that the manufacturer controls operations with proper information, seeing 
the market through dealers. Therefore, manufacturers could share ISs in order to proactively 
manage their distribution channels in a non-coercive way.
Key words: Information Systems, Control Problems, Distribution Channel, Case Study.
. INTRODUCTION
Facing the challenges associated with getting a product to the right place at 
the right time at the lowest cost, a manufacturing firm may sell their products 
through a set of independent firms (Stern et al., 1996). These dealers have greater 
market knowledge and flexibility, giving the manufacturer cost and investment 
reductions (Celly and Frazier, 1996). However, once the distribution channel 
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is established, differences in objectives arise (Stern et al., 1996) and there is a 
lack of the advantages of a hierarchical structure (Gulati and Singh, 1998). This 
may be aggravated by the influence that a bad dealer’s service could have on the 
manufacturer’s reputation. 
In this sense, shared information, in terms of the extent to which channel 
members proactively exchange information with each other, has been found to be 
critical for the effective functioning of distribution channels (Li and Dant, 1997). 
Thus, Information Systems (ISs) could enhance these inter-firm relationships (Ritter 
and Gemünden, 2003), facilitating an efficient and effective informational flow. 
Integration and coordination via IS has become a key to improved distribution 
channel performance (Barut et al., 2002). However, although scholars and 
practitioners in various fields have turned their attention to sharing information, 
it appears that manufacturers harbor a disinclination to reveal more than minimal 
information since such disclosure could be perceived as a loss of control. Owing to 
the adversarial nature of business, managers tend to overestimate the possible risks 
without seeing the potential benefits and thus are reluctant to share information 
with their partners (Huang and Gangopadhyay, 2004). Previous research suggests 
that shared ISs could create perceived risks from privacy concerns, in turn making 
the system vulnerable to fraud (Papazoglous, 2000; McKnight et al., 2002). 
Recognizing this gap, and according to Baiman and Rajan’s (2002) proposal, 
our aim is to explore what impels a manufacturer to rationally share its ISs in its 
established distribution channel. In this vein, to understand the need for shared ISs, 
we distinguish three control problems: lack of direction, motivational problems, and 
personal limitations, extending Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2003) framework 
to distribution channels. This allows us to analyse whether Merchant and Van 
der Stede’s control problems, defined for intra-organizational settings, persist in 
outsourced distribution channels. An exploratory case study approach (Yin, 1984) 
has been adopted because it allows us to capture the complexities of distribution 
channels. As a research site, we studied the distribution channel of a manufacturing 
firm called CMD (an assumed name). This is because, during the period of study 
1985-2004, the firm has opted to share its ISs with its dealers. 
Our research contributes to the existing literature in different ways. We focus 
on the manufacturer’s perspective in a market-focused relationship as a potential 
ISs developer and information sharer to analyse what motivated it to develop shared 
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ISs. Through the analysis of control problems, we defend that they persist in an 
inter-organizational context. Thus, the need to manage these control problems 
motivate that manufacturers develop shared ISs, in contrast to previous research 
that defended the proposition that outsourced distribution channels avoided the 
need for administrative systems. In addition to the assumption of existing literature 
on sharing information that improves inter-firm coordination, sharing ISs can 
also help the manufacturing firms to acquire increasingly reliable information to 
better control its distribution channel members’ activities. We find that sharing IS 
provides benefits derived from the timely collection of information in both quantity 
and quality that the manufacturers can then utilize. Therefore, manufacturers, 
overcoming their reluctance, could share their ISs in order to proactively manage 
their distribution channel in a non-coercive way, controlling the end-market through 
their dealers. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we analyse the distribution channel 
context and its potential control problems, studying the role of shared ISs. Secondly, 
we present a case study of how CMD introduced a set of shared ISs tools to support 
its distribution channel management efforts. This case description is followed by 
a discussion and explanation of case findings, followed by conclusions. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
As parts of supply chains, distribution channels are configured as non-equity 
contractual alliances, with closer interactions than arms-lengths relationships. 
Within distribution channels typologies, we focus on industrial dealers, who 
have three distinctive features: 1. a revenue-sharing contract offered by the 
manufacturer; 2. a production or inventory quantity and retail price decision 
made by the manufacturer; and 3. inventory consignment, i.e., full ownership 
of inventory retained by the manufacturer. Under the consignment contract, 
a bigger upstream manufacturer delegates to smaller downstream dealers the 
exclusive rights to a customer’s segment. Dealers give the manufacturer cost and 
investment reductions, in addition to greater flexibility and continuity (Stern et al., 
1996). Furthermore, dealers can generate synergies when they represent various 
manufacturers (noncompetitors), and when they perform tasks that a single product 
cannot justify. In this line, the literature on marketing supports the view that 
fully-owned distribution channels require investment in administrative systems to 
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manage activities, and that manufacturers could choose to avoid these by opting 
for a distribution channel (Anderson and Oliver, 1987). 
Despite the benefits of distribution channels, the consensus of many 
researchers is that conflict is pervasive throughout all distribution channels (Stern 
et al., 1996). Distribution channels are composed of independent dealers with 
individual preferences, which could imply that the manufacturer depends on 
(and delegates authority to) a set of dealers to deliver goods and services to the 
selling point. In this sense, dealers could focus their behaviours on short-term 
profits, abandoning activities with no immediate and concrete pay-off, which 
could harm manufacturer objectives (Anderson, 1985). The problems could be 
aggravated when the manufacturer feels that dealers are irreplaceable because 
they have closer relationships with end customers or have better local market 
knowledge. In this sense, we propose to extend to an inter-organizational context 
the framework proposed by Merchant (1985) and Merchant and Van der Stede 
(2003). These authors argue that in an intra-organizational context, the need for 
control systems is rooted in control problems. Establishing that control problems 
can occur simultaneously, Merchant and Van der Stede (2003) classify them into 
three broad categories: (i) Lack of direction: when people do not know what 
the organization wants from them; (ii) Motivational problems: when people and 
organizational objectives do not naturally coincide, and people are self-interested; 
and (iii) Personal limitations: when people are simply unable to do a good job 
because of certain personal limitations, highlighting that a common limitation is 
a lack of information. 
Some authors argue that the effective management of distribution channels 
requires manufacturers to increase information availability for internal users as 
well as authorized dealers. Integration and coordination via ISs has been found to 
be key to improved distribution channel performance (Barut et al., 2002). Thus, 
ISs could represent a valuable information resource management philosophy rather 
than just a technical systems issue (Arunachalam, 2004). ISs could allow efficient 
and effective flows of both informational and physical goods in a seamless fashion. 
Sharing information enables firms to coordinate and pursue common objectives 
(Arunachalam, 2004). Its inherent flexibility could help firms to quickly adopt 
new measures to adapt to changes in the environment (Chandrashekar and Schary, 
1999). Porter and Millar (1985) related ISs to the value chain, concluding that the 
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main purpose of ISs was to coordinate activities in the chain. In this sense, ISs 
ensures consistent information for all centres, avoiding information duplication 
and enhancing decision-making processes. 
However, although ISs have been adopted in a diversity of organizations and the 
degree of penetration is exceptionally high, they are not so common in distribution 
channels. Although scholars and practitioners in various fields have turned their 
attention to sharing information, it appears that managers of manufacturing firms 
have a disinclination to give away more than minimal information since disclosure 
is perceived as a loss of control. Owing to the adversarial nature of business, 
managers are reluctant to share information with their partners because they tend 
to overestimate the possible risks without seeing the potential benefits (Huang 
and Gangopadhyay, 2004). In fact, some authors argue that a shared IS increases 
perceived risks from privacy concerns, in turn making the system vulnerable to 
fraud (Papazoglous, 2000; McKnight et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, studies concerned with the role of data interchange among various 
partners have not received the attention they deserve (Lau and Lee, 2000). The large 
investment in a shared IS and its inherent risks may be concerns for reasonable 
managers, raising some questions that need further research. The loss of resources 
–money and manpower – when implementations are flawed or fail is huge (Robey 
et al., 2002). Thus, according to the above arguments, our research question arises: 
What could impel manufacturing firms to share their proprietary ISs?. 
3. DESIGN AND CASE STUDY RESEARCH
In order to provide an answer to our research question, following a design by 
Yin (1984), we conducted a case study from the perspective of a manufacturing 
firm called CMD (an assumed name). As a part of a larger research project, our 
field study was chosen based on two considerations: (1) the distribution channel 
was successful, longstanding, and stable; (2) the case showed that CMD, during 
the period of study 1992-2004, opted to share its ISs with its dealers. In line with 
Yin’s (1984) suggestions, we followed three principles to provide validity and 
reliability: using multiple sources of evidence; creating a case study database; and 
maintaining a chain of evidence.
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3.. Data collection and analysis
The necessary information to establish the sequence of analysed events was 
obtained by means of archival sources, direct observations, and interview data. 
The most rich and detailed archival sources were the different types of contracts, 
the dealers’ evaluation system, the summary of all the periodical joint meetings, 
and the projects and procedures documents. Supplementary archival data contain 
a large number of financial and commercial reports, improvement project reports, 
and internal and external newsletters. Interviews were employed to gain more 
information and to complement and contrast the archival data, which served to 
triangulate our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). On the basis of the revised literature, 
a guide for semi-structured interviews was developed to focus on the process 
of data collection in the development of the ISs. Thus, the interviews with the 
employees of CMD were carried out with a double aim: (a) to complete and to 
contrast the previously gathered information; and (b) to deepen understanding of 
aspects that were ignored and that were especially interesting in the study. We 
interviewed 20 members of CMD’s management team face-to-face (November 
2002 to June 2003). Interviewees were chosen based on their direct relation to the 
dealers’ IS development. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and 
the completed write-up was sent to the interviewees for comment. We also assisted 
in the four joint meetings (2001-2004), as well as several informal meetings and 
phone conversations with some of CMD’s managers and dealers. 
In our research, we analysed the case data, focusing our efforts on the events that 
appeared to have an impact on the shared IS development process, a technique that 
can provide insight into “what led to what, and when” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
p. 110). This procedure helped us to trace four events that were chronologically 
ordered, in order to maintain the chain of evidence. 
3.2. Distribution channel information system at CMD
CMD was established in the late 19th century and it is currently the leader 
in its Spanish chemical sector. Its outsourced distribution channel is configured 
as a non-equity alliance with a set of dealers, who sell its products to a great 
number of small and medium sized businesses. Dealers receive its products under 
consignment, and are delegated the activities of commercialisation, warehousing, 
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transport, and management of CMD customers’ portfolios. Although its industrial 
products are commodities that do not differ from those of its competitors, CMD’s 
approach to working with its dealers is its main value. According to interviews, its 
distribution channel management allows it to differentiate itself from competitor 
firms, provide its final customers with a satisfactory service level, and maintain 
market premium prices. 
3.2.1. Distribution channel information system development
Antecedents. From its beginning, CMD entrusted in some transporters with 
its delivery and warehousing tasks for two primary reasons: logistic costs and 
market positioning. From 1985 onwards, CMD began to establish the contractual 
framework of the relationship, focusing on the legal and labour aspects. As a 
result, a sole contract type is used for these independent entities, regardless 
of their varying sizes, legal constitution, and other activities. Also, CMD took 
advantage of the introduction of the contract to establish the sales commission 
system. Thus, the dealers operate in exclusivity and they are commissioned by its 
sales in a geographical area. However, on occasions, it is CMD who carries out 
the deliveries to the customer. On the other hand, CMD established its commercial 
department in the late 1980s to carry out the commercial functions of direct sales 
and attending to customers. CMD assigned each commercial employee a dealers 
group to supervise all its activities. 
Although the sales were carried out through the distribution channel, CMD 
billed its customers directly. This is because CMD sent books of delivery notes, 
which the dealers completed manually for each product delivery. These notes 
were sent once a month by postcard to the different centres of CMD for their 
records. With this system, CMD carried out the billing for its products to the final 
customers, but it could neither foresee nor assign appropriate stocks to the dealers, 
overstocking its own and dealers’ warehouses. At the same time, many errors of 
billing were detected. 
In order to preserve the chain of evidence, the facts are structured in order to 
show the chronological evolution of IS development in the period of study, 1992-
2004. Figure 1 summarizes the time line associated with these events.
148
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 12
Years 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002-04
Informatization 
project
Electronic data 
integration
Dealers’ market-
ing plan
Web-based 
integration
Figure 1. Main Landmarks Related to the Distribution Channel Information System
992. Informatization project
In 1992, CMD hired a consultant firm to analyse its entire business. The 
consultants recommended transferring the distribution channel to re-sellers (like 
its competitors). CMD’s managers considered that this option could facilitate the 
administrative tasks and the dealers’ control, but that in turn they would lose the 
control of the containers and of the final market, aspects that lead it to refuse the 
proposal. 
Instead, CMD decided to install computers and software in large dealerships 
(more than 120 invoices of products/month delivery). The software specifically 
developed for these dealers allowed them to outsource the administrative activities 
of product delivery and the release of invoices, which, from that moment on, were 
only the responsibility of the dealers. Also, with the information transmitted twice 
monthly via modem, CMD was able to know the location of containers and to 
obtain twice-weekly information on sales, stocks of dealers, and final customers. 
Also, with the new systems, the dealers recorded all their invoices, which resulted 
in the reduction of errors and reduced paperwork. This allowed CMD to carry out 
gradual staff reductions, closing some own centres and reducing the workload of 
others. 
998. Electronic data integration
As a continuation of the above project, CMD installed new computers and its 
own software, sharing it with all its dealers and delegating new functions to them 
(opening and maintenance of customers’ records, discounts in prices, invoice copies, 
dealers’ and customers’ stock control, logistic management, complaints recording, 
and customers’ debt control). Thus, they also increased the externalisation of 
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activities, and maintained the control through the establishment of authorization 
procedures and passwords. This system, with twice weekly reporting, allowed 
CMD to increase their knowledge of the allocation of inventory between dealers, 
gaining greater information and control of dealers. According to the interviews 
and the documents, with these new systems they not only eliminated a significant 
quantity of work, reduced stocks, and increased the rotation ratios in warehouses, 
but they also avoided errors and increased the information from (and the control 
of) the dealers. 
999. Dealers’ marketing plan
The dealers’ marketing plan was based on two key planks: (a) a “dealers’ 
scorecard”; and (b) a data base:
-(a) Dealers’ scorecard. CMD established a computer application (“dealers 
control scorecard”) to share commercial information with its dealers, which was 
given the same name as the internal tool for the commercial department: “gescom”. 
The intention was: “to improve coordination between our commercial staff and 
dealers. The information would allow the dealer to: (i) obtain better knowledge 
of the evolution of its customers; (ii) plan and solve problems more quickly; (iii) 
coordinate its work with the sales network” (Project Memory). This information 
allowed dealers to have the necessary information to improve their sales activities, 
and it included falls in consumption, signing of new customers, package contracts, 
analysis of sales vs. previous year, analysis of sales by concepts, or the stock of 
packages by the customers. The commercial department provided training in the 
use of the new information, because although dealers already had access to it 
(through customer invoices copies) this more organised and aggregated format 
was more helpful. This information also allowed the establishment and pursuit 
of the dealers’ objectives and improvement projects. This IS, in some cases, even 
improved the manufacturer’s own commercial department activities by providing 
an extra management tool. 
-(b) Dealers’ database. This internal tool gathers information on the different 
tasks and functions of the dealers (e.g., sales, commissions, dedication percentage, 
number of sales staff, capacity of trucks, or customer attention schedule). The 
interviewees consider it a tool enabling them to carry out benchmarking analysis 
and to evaluate each dealer’s evolution. 
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2002. Web-based integration
At the present time, the ISs is completely integrated through different databases 
with on-line access via the Internet. CMD has designed a web page that currently 
includes all of the former tools, as well as some new services. As the dealers’ manager 
comments in an e-mail of July 2002: “The sections that compose the dealers’ web are: 
– the Dealers’ Handbook, information and operational norms of the functions carried 
out by the dealers. – Dealer’s addresses, to locate and obtain the data from dealers, as 
well as the activities that develop. [...] – CMD News: communication magazine for 
dealers – Services that CMD offers to dealers, such as civil responsibility insurance, 
safety consultation, or ISO-9000. – Dealer News: to publish opinions, applications 
or offers. – Basic computer applications, and – email addresses for each dealer to 
facilitate communication with the customers and with CMD”.
Since 1999, CMD observes a strong cost reduction and a sales increase (see 
Figure 2). The cost reduction is mainly based on the closure of own centres and 
on the reductions in CMD’s staff. Likewise, the sales increase can be attributed to 
several factors, among which are the evolution of the market itself, the premium 
prices policy, the dealers’ sales focus, the introduction of new services supplied by 
the dealers (services which are billed by CMD to the final customers), and to allow 
to CMD’s commercial department to give more attention to another market functions. 
Finally, in the course of this shared ISs establishment, a reduction in the number of 
dealers has been observed, falling from almost 300 dealers in the late 1980’s to 178 
at present. CMD managers highlight the fact that it has been necessary to reduce the 
number of small dealers, assigning their area to other more medium sized dealers. 
Year No. Dealers Direct Sales Dealers Sales Total
1997 220 $MM 36 71 107% 34% 66%
1998 218 $MM 38 78 116% 33% 67%
1999 214 $MM 29 78 107% 27% 73%
2000 201 -- -- -- --
2001 195 $MM 40 78 118% 34% 66%
2002 188 $MM 47 84 131% 36% 64%
2003 181 $MM 45 95 140% 32% 68%
2004 178 -- -- -- --
Figure 2. Distribution channel evolution
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4. DISCUSSION
The case study allows us to explore the role of shared ISs to manage distribution 
channels that are already established, and their contribution to mitigation of the 
underlying control problems. The case study shows that since the 1980s, CMD 
managed the established relationship through contract, direct supervision and 
commission systems. But CMD has found that these systems caused an information 
asymmetry in the relationship. On one hand, these tools did not allow CMD to 
gain access to the dealer’s private information, about their behaviour, knowledge, 
performance, and environment. As argued by Martimort (1996), the dealers, due 
to their proximity, direct treatment and knowledge of the local market, observe 
aspects of their customers that CMD does not. This is aggravated by the necessity 
for information about the final market, a critical aspect to CMD. On the other hand, 
CMD also possesses privileged information, concerning strategies and promotion 
campaigns for its products, politics of sales, or about the evolution of the sector 
that would improve the decision-making process of the dealers.  
In terms of Merchant and Van der Stede’ framework (2003), this bi-directional 
informational imbalance caused control problems in an inter-organizational 
context:
Lack of Direction problems, which arise because the contract and the commercial 
staff fail when transmitting to the dealers exactly what CMD expects from them. 
The contract is regarded as a mere “starting point” from which the relationship 
is developed. It is incomplete because it is understood to be the legal framework 
that outlines the principal obligations and rights of the parties. The commercial 
department was the only intermediary between CMD and the dealers, which led 
often to miscommunication, misinterpretation, or oversight. The commercial 
department staff did not guarantee the control and management of the dealers’ 
activities, given their limited monitoring capacity (Baldenius et al., 2002). 
The sole use of the remuneration by commission system is insufficient to 
motivate and align channel objectives, leading to emergent Motivational problems. 
CMD offers its dealers its portfolio of customers, through which the dealer can 
benefit from a fixed level of income from the beginning of the relationship. With 
this incentive system, a bad dealer in a good area may obtain high commissions 
152
 The International Journal of Digital Accounting Research   Vol. 6, N. 12
and vice versa. CMD finds that this system of remuneration failed to motivate 
either the search for business opportunities or an optimal level of customer service 
(Mishra et al., 1998). According to Anderson (1985), CMD observed the tendency 
for some dealers to pay disproportionate attention to customers with a higher sales 
volume that make the service more profitable. In this sense, another shortfall of 
the commission system is that it fails to motivate package collection; a fact that 
meant CMD was unable to reach its targets of container rotation. 
Another problem arises from the personal limitations of the dealers. CMD 
took its first steps towards dealers by recruiting existing transporters who already 
acted as deliverers of its products. CMD detected lack of training, resources, and 
capacity within the dealers group. Thus, lacking sale abilities and knowledge, 
some dealers ignored the different applications of the CMD products. In this sense, 
the fact that they were good transporting firms did not mean that they were good 
dealers, according to the very well known Peter Principle. Furthermore, they did 
not have the information that allowed them to work efficiently.
CMD, motivated by the need to manage these control problems, opted to 
share information and to supervise the critical aspects of the relationship better. 
In so doing, they develop an interorganizational IS, in contrast to the literature on 
marketing that argues that manufacturers should choose to avoid administrative 
system investments (Anderson and Oliver, 1987). Therefore, the findings show 
that in an outsourced channel of distribution, the problems defined by Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2003) persist in an inter-organizational context. Moreover, the 
incremental delegation of functions causes CMD to be more dependent on (and 
vulnerable to) the behaviour of the dealers, according to Frazier and Antia (1995), 
as well as increasing the necessity to manage its distribution channel. 
During the period of study, CMD developed a more complex IS to deal with 
its distribution channel. In contrast to the advice of the consultant firm, CMD 
opted to control the end-market through the distribution channel. These new ISs 
help CMD manage the problems of lack of direction by establishing the necessary 
procedures to carry out activities, by defining the desired results from those aspects 
that CMD considers critical (new commercialization and administrative functions, 
container or customer management), when appraising dealers regularly, and when 
establishing benchmarking systems with the aim of encouraging behaviour that 
brings desirable results. 
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CMD has developed new IS tools that complete the direct supervision carried 
out by the commercial staff, defining and transmitting acceptable limits of desirable 
actions. CMD manages the problem of lack of direction and reinforces its direct 
supervision by supplying its commercial staff with the necessary IS through which 
they can perform on the basis of solid information, which helps CMD to correct 
dealers’ behaviour. Thus, CMD increases its confidence that dealers will carry 
out certain desirable actions, or avoid undesirable ones, reducing the risk of a bad 
service to the final customer. 
Additionally, CMD’s commercial staff training, assistance, and encouragement 
to dealers to do the job properly helped to solve the problem of personal limitations. 
CMD gathers information on its dealers need through ISs, detecting their needs. It 
also fosters dealer socialization through inter-organizational transference of CMD 
know-how. The shared character of the ISs provide the dealers with the necessary 
information to make their decisions on a better-informed basis.
The results of the case study show that when improving the information of 
the dealers, CMD improves the coordination between both parties, increasing 
the performance of the distribution channel. Facilitating and increasing the 
informational flow, CMD tries to mitigate the probability of (and potential damage 
from) a bad dealer’s service. According to Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan (1991), 
a dealer who has access to the best pre-decision information is able to use it to 
make better decisions. In this sense, our case study confirms the fact that shared 
ISs help firms to coordinate and pursue common objectives (Arunachalam, 2004), 
helping to quickly adopt and adapt to changes in the environment (Chandrashekar 
and Schary, 1999). 
But, as Speklé (2001) argues, we could understand that to share information 
is not gratuitous. The value of sharing ISs is that improves the performance of the 
dealers for the attainment of its goals. As Baiman and Sivaramakrishnan (1991) 
propose, a way in which the manufacturing firms can mitigate any negative effect 
of improving the dealer’s information is to require them to communicate, in turn, 
their private information. The case shows how a shared IS represents benefits to 
CMD that are derived from the information that was gathered from the dealers. In 
addition, the shared IS helps CMD to ensure the reliability of the data, reducing 
errors, and guaranteeing that it is supervising with correct information. Therefore, 
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in CMD’s own interest, shared IS makes it possible to check if agreements are being 
fulfilled, as well as to detect their dealers’ weak points, reducing CMD’s dependence 
on its dealers. Furthermore, CMD also uses the information gathered by the IS to 
benchmark the best dealers, reducing its dealers base. In this sense, integration 
and coordination via ISs offers the advantages of a hierarchical structure (Gulati 
and Singh, 1998). The case study shows how the manufacturer not only does not 
suffer a loss of control, but rather increases the level of control of its dealers and 
its end-market; without fixed costs and large investment. Thus, manufacturers can 
see the potential benefits, evaluate the possible risks, and overcome their reluctance 
to share information with their partners.
In summary, a shared IS improves the management of the CMD partnership. 
A shared IS completes and re-drives the agreement; in a flexible and non-coercive 
way, motivating the development of a partnership. With shared IS development, 
CMD increases information flows, improves congruence of objectives and reduces 
the number of dealers. CMD accepts the potential risk that dealers may use the 
information against them, weighing it against the benefits of a consolidated 
partnership such as shared interests and common targets, or distribution channel 
dealer compliance. 
5. CONCLUSION
This case study allows us to explore the role of a shared IS in influencing 
the ongoing management in an outsourcing context, extending the scope beyond 
firm limits. We report on how shared ISs are developed in an already established 
non-equity alliance to increase the extent of outsourcing, and to manage control 
problems. A shared IS allows the manufacturing firm to continue as the leader in 
market share and premium prices, which can lead to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
An inherent aspect of distribution channels is the conflict of objectives. This 
causes problems defined in an intra-organizational context (lack of direction, 
motivational problems, and personal limitations) to persist in an outsourced 
distribution channel, increasing when the manufacturing firm decides to enhance 
the quantity and complexity of the tasks delegated to the dealers. This, in 
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turn, highlights the need to develop and increase interorganizational ISs that 
permit sharing information to coordinate and to monitor the key aspects of the 
relationship. 
Case findings show how a manufacturing firm accepts the potential risk that 
dealers may use the shared information against it weighed against the benefits 
of developing a partnership. Sharing an IS represents benefits derived from the 
increased information that, in turn, the manufacturer collects. A shared IS increases 
the data’ reliability, assuring that the manufacturing firm is monitoring operations 
with proper information. Additionally, a shared IS permits a manufacturer to 
foresee problems or correct them in a timely manner, as well as offering a way 
to see the final market through the distribution channel, reducing manufacturer’s 
dependence on its dealers. 
Thus, the growth of partnerships demands an IS that could be a key enabler 
of a strategic relationship. Although ISs have been traditionally seen as tools to 
improve functions and internal operations, they are necessary to facilitate the 
administration of management problems that are not eliminated when carrying 
out activities outside of the firm. In this sense, outsourced distribution channels 
could also require ISs that allow the manufacturing firm to manage the operations. 
The case study supplies empirical evidence showing how shared ISs complete and 
ease the re-drive of inter-firm agreements and constitute a key tool for managing 
and maintaining inter-firm relationships in a flexible and non-coercive way. 
Because most distribution channel improvement initiatives would be impossible 
to implement without timely, effective information sharing among members. 
Finally, we must mention some limitations and future research questions. The 
evidence presented is based on the criterion of a single in-depth study, and therefore 
it would be interesting to complement these results with data both from dealers’ 
perspective, to analyse their IS’s uses, and from other case studies, with the aim 
of analysing and contrasting possible differences. At the end of our study period, 
we have found evidence of the coming implementation of a new SAP system. The 
implications for its use with the dealers would be interesting to analyse. 
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